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Abstract: Policy implications of complexity economics (CE) are investigated. CE deals with 
“Complex Adaptive (Economic) Systems” [CA(E)S], generally characterized by mechanisms and 
properties such as “emergence” of structure or some capacity of “self-organization”. With this, 
CE has manifold affinities with economic heterodoxies. CE has developed into a most promising 
economic research program in the last decades. With some time lag, and boosted by the financial 
crisis and Great Recession, a surge to explore their policy implications recently emerged. It 
demonstrated the flaws of the “neoliberal” policy prescriptions mostly derived from the 
neoclassical mainstream and its underlying more simplistic and teleological equilibrium models. 
However, most of the complexity-policy literature still remains rather general. For a subset of 
CA(E)S, those with heterogeneous human agents interacting, particularly on networks, using 
evolutionary games in the “evolution-of-cooperation” tradition, therefore, we exemplarily derive 
more specific policy orientations and tools, and a framework policy approach called Interactive 
Policy. 
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1. Introduction: Simplistic vs complex economics and policies 
 
The neoclassically based “mainstream” policy conception – propagated less in research as in 
mass education, towards the mass media, and in the policy-advice business (e.g., Zuidhof 2014) – 
is a fundamentally normative prescription rather than a set of recommendations with a 
consideration of alternative options, diverse pathways and horizons, and estimations of actual 
action spaces. But it usually is not overtly normative but crypto-normative, particularly in its 
mostly “neoliberal”3 attitude of “T-i-n-a” (“There-is-no-alternative!”), to creating ever “more 
market”, or imitating some market ideal (ibid.). Its tacit message “There-is-only-one-optimal-
point-in-the-universe”, in turn, not only is unrealistic and crypto-normative, it also is derived 
from its simplistic approach. The latter is basically a mathematically tractable, deterministic 
model, serving a tacit historical function and message “The market economy is the optimum, the 
culmination and end of human history!” This is mirrored in models with a unique and universal-
benchmark equilibrium, pretending to be strict science by (mistakenly) mimicking 19th-century 
equation models of mechanical physics, 4 oriented towards a deterministic analytical solution. The 
basic model of an always equilibrating “market” economy served neoclassicism’s strive to be 
“hard science”, based on “eternal laws”, and the ultimate historical answer, but did rule out 
reality and complexity. 5 Thus, it is to be imposed on society and politics in a teleological vein 
and with a coercive attitude. 
 
                                                          
3 This is neither “neo” (new) nor can, in its practical consequences, whether intended or not, be “liberal” for the 
common man in any reasonable sense. Note that, of course, we do not fully identify analytical neoclassical 
economics with political neoliberalism. 
4 Note, however (as, e.g., Fontana, Terna 2015 point out), that the idea that economies can be controlled in mechanic 
ways was not exclusively neoclassical, but lingered also in some non-mainstream approaches, until they pioneered 
into economic complexity, and re-read their classics (e.g., Smith, Marx, Keynes). 
5 For a more detailed analysis of the ruling out of complexity by neoclassical economics, e.g., Fontana 2010, 584; 
van den Berg 2015. 
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However, this is methodologically naïve and untenable in any respect.6 Also, with this, this 
cannot provide any appropriate, theoretically fruitful understanding of evolving process or longer 
time horizon, of emerging coordination and cooperation,7 of any collectivity, commonality, or 
collective rationality, and, finally, of any proactive and learning policy perspective, of 
participation, or democracy (more below). Everything is subordinated to a static comparison with 
an abstract ideal brain construct. 
 
Logically, then, with the slightest alteration of the assumptions of a general-equilibrium, the 
available next Second Best state would require more violations of “optimality conditions”, as was 
elaborated in the 1950s already (Lipsey, Lancaster 1956/7). Thus, if the “optimum” is not 
attained, there would be no straightforward piecemeal policy to re-approach it. Simple ways to 
the “optimum”, through just “more market”, however, is what the politically mostly neoliberal 
economic mainstream suggests in theory, mass education, and policy advice since four decades. 
 
The much needed more adequate approach to deal with political control of a complex economy 
has never been elaborated for practical policy by this mainstream. The political-economic power 
play of simple and quick “solutions”, the neoliberal rough-and-ready strategy of “de-regulation 
cum privatization”, based on modern mythologizations of markets and money, has been 
reinforced, rather, by interested governments and super-bureaucracies. And, as was foreseeable, 
this has skyrocketed the degeneration of the markets into unprecedented oligopolization and 
“power-ization” and into multi-layered global hub&spoke networks under control of a few dozen 
core financial groups (e.g., Vitali, Glattfelder, Battiston 2011). It, obviously, has made the 
                                                          
6 For a thorough methodological and epistemological critique of neoclassical crypto-normativism, immunization 
strategies, and unlimited “ad-hocery”, e.g., Kapeller 2013. 
7 This distinction refers to the solution of coordination games and social dilemmas, resp. 
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powerful more powerful and the rich richer, and politics and policies their appendage. And it has 
been too alluring for many leading economists to stay with the powerful and rich, and their 
research sponsoring. 
 
Manifold theoretical developments contributed to the simplistic and coercive current economic-
policy worldview. In public-choice theory, for instance, Arrow’s voting paradox was often (mis-
)interpreted, namely in the policy-advice business in the neoliberal era, against the feasibility of 
collective and longer-run rationality and rational, ameliorating policy in general, stressing state 
failure instead. But this misinterpretation did not properly consider complex structures and 
processes either, with, e.g., endogenous preference change – as was elaborated namely by A. Sen 
(1970/1984), who managed in this way to initiate some broadening of the theoretical and policy 
perspectives, but, of course, could not change the dominating policy paradigm. 
 
As another example, Hayekian fallacies also prevented the elaboration of complex and qualified 
policies beyond neoliberal privatization, commodification, “marketization”, and dismantling of 
the welfare state. First, though, in a complexity approach, Hayek did recognize a self-
organization capacity of market systems. This, however, also remained in a teleological vein, as 
it was considered to generate a natural “spontaneous order”, relatively optimal, as compared, at 
least, to state intervention (with its allegedly dominating state failure). Heroic assumptions 
related to a distribution of information among agents so that some wisdom of the crowd (in a 
“market”) would become effective. Second, an extreme version of an ultimate unpredictability of 
any policy consequences under such complexity contributed to a general attitude, if perhaps not 
of Hayek himself, but of most Hayekians, of a policy abstinence (see, e.g., Bloch, Metcalfe 2011, 
87; Durlauf 2012, 62ff.). Policies, thus, again should be basically the creation of “more market”. 
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But self-organization capacities of complex adaptive (economic) systems [CA(E)S] cannot 
redudantize policy, as the capability of some self-organization generally generates no (“optimal”, 
”natural”) spontaneous order in the Hayekian sense. It implies a so-called dissipative structure 
of an open non-linear system in a non-equilibrium process between order and disorder, as, e.g., 
structural emergence in evolutionary process, morphogenesis, or autopoiesis, how specified ever. 
Self-organized order as such, although relatively stable, is very relative, rather, dependent on 
system parameters, and may quickly be replaced by disorder in so-called phase transitions. Order 
and disorder, stability and volatility may alternate in (apparently) irregular ways (e.g., Room 
2011, Chpt.17). As recently stated by Colander and Kupers: 
 
“… seeing the social system as a complex evolutionary system is quite different from seeing it as 
a self-steering system requiring the government to play no role, as seems to be suggested by 
unsophisticated market advocates” (Colander, Kupers 2014, 5). 
 
Particularly, for decentralized spontaneous economic (“market”) systems, with their often myopic 
(individualistic) human agents (with only local knowledge and habituated short-sightedness), we 
do know too many, and mostly dominating, mechanisms of fallacies of aggregation and 
unintended consequences that undermine a clear-cut connection of “self-organization” with 
“optimality” and “naturalness” in any reasonable sense. For instance, inferior lock-in and other 
sub-optimal phenomena of CA(E)S may mirror technological conditions (such as network 
externalities) and/or ceremonial degenerations.8  
 
                                                          
8 In a Veblenian understanding, reflecting a dominating value of differential power and status; for detail, e.g., Bush 
1987. 
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A CA(E)S indeed is based on an openness towards, and increasing metabolism with, the social 
and natural subsystems, increasing its own complexity at the expense of increased metabolism 
with them and increasing entropy of the entire ecolo-socio-economic system (Georgescu-Roegen 
1966). And, namely capitalist market economies, according to institutional and ecological 
economist K.W. Kapp, are even formally “designed” for reinforced institutionalized exploitation 
of the social and natural systems (Kapp 1950). This all prevents considering CA(E)S “self-
sustaining” and “self-equilibrating” in any “optimal” or “natural” manner. 
 
CE actually suggests that self-organization, in terms of equilibria, usually is one out of multiple 
equilibria9, and, specifically under conditions of individualist rationality (a “hyper-rationality”), 
some problem-solving self-organization, e.g., some informal and instrumental institutional 
emergence, may be extremely time-consuming and fragile (prone to backslide), if not blocked at 
all (more below). 
 
As said, self-organizing capacities of CA(E)S are part of interacting forces of order and disorder, 
often irregularly alternating between relative stability and sudden discontinuity. For instance, 
even scale-invariant phenomena, such as fractals and power laws (see below), often emerge just 
from simple local interactions, so-called self-organized criticality;10 but particularly in complex 
socio-economic systems, any stable emerged structure (equilibria, attractors, fixed points), 
including “self-organized” scale-free distributions among components, is irrespective of any 
optimality (more below). 
 
                                                          
9 In CAS in general, so-called fixed points, be they stable or instable. 
10 See the famous sand pile example, where new sand grains slowly sprinkled eventually cause avalanches and 
restore the same slope of the sand pile at any scale (see Bak, Tang, Wiesenfeld 1987). 
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In all, the requirement of policy interventions is strongly underpinned because of the different 
apparent shortcomings of self-organizing socio-economic processes. Such policy, then, will not 
be just any rampant interventionism, no “road to serfdom”.11 On the contrary, complex, systemic, 
long-run, learning and adaptive policy would in fact avoid cumulatively increasing ad-hoc 
interventions. And while “stagflation”, increasing distributional conflicts and other specters were, 
according to the neoliberal narratives of the 1970s and 1980s, the results of “Keynesian” welfare-
state interventions, those specters were, at least in part, just a reflection of a perceived “over-
complexity”, from specific real-world problems, of the decision situation of a partly unwilling 
and partly incapable political, parliamentary, and party system, and of partly unwilling, partly 
under-qualified governments and public administrations. 
 
Since the financial crisis and Great Recession, it has become obvious to an increasing number of 
economists that we need micro- and macroeconomic models different from conventional ones. 
This also applies to the allegedly more real-world and more policy relevant, but nevertheless 
linear and teleological “dynamic stochastic general equilibrium” (DSGE) models: Here, policy 
impacts are measured by comparisons between pre-and post-policy equilibria (or adjustment 
paths), where structures are constant and changes, including policy measures, just exogenous. 
Adaptations to new phenomena, as in the neoclassical research program in general, mostly occur 
through unlimited “ad-hocery”, often even violating neoclassical standard axioms. 12 
 
But we need complex nonlinear models, and particularly those that reflect new microfoundations 
considering many heterogeneous agents in continuing interaction, i.e., dynamic agent-based 
                                                          
11 For recent arguments in the Hayekian vein, e.g., Gaus 2007, and, against policies reacting to the financial crisis 
and Great Recession, e.g., Lewin 2014. 
12 For a more in-depth critique of DSGE models, e.g., Colander et al. 2008. 
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interactions (agent-based models, ABM), being only stochastically solvable, thus, computer 
simulations, rather than analytically tractable and uniquely solvable equation-based models.13 
Their policy implications will involve a completely new policy paradigm, where not only the 
CA(E)S itself but also the feedbacks between the system and policy reactions will be open-ended, 
dynamic, and structurally variable with the system development, and policy somehow becomes 
endogenous. 
 
While discontent with the state of economics has grown both among practitioners and within the 
discipline, among both researchers and student networks, CE has developed into a most 
promising economic research program in the last three or four decades. 14 Its basic research 
questions are largely in line with long-standing heterodox issues and in obvious relation with 
current economic heterodoxies. But positive policy implications of CE have become a major 
theme only recently,15 naturally occurring with some time lag vis-à-vis its basic explaining 
paradigm, and particularly boosted by the financial crisis and Great Recession (e.g., Geyer, 
Rihani 2010; Room 2011; Beinhocker 2012; Durlauf 2012; Fontana 2012; Colander, Kupers 
2014; Fontana, Terna 2015; Elsner, Heinrich, Schwardt 2015, Chpt. 17). 
 
However, much of this literature still is rather general, qualitative and verbal and has not 
sufficiently developed policy implications derivable from specified models yet.16 Therefore, in 
                                                          
13 For more detail on the different formal methods used in mainstream and in CE, e.g., Fontana 2010, 591f. 
14 For some core texts of the increasing richness of CE, see, e.g., Waldrop 1992; Keen 2001; Velupillai 2005; Foster 
2005, 2006; Garnsey, McGlade 2006; Miller, Page 2007; Beinhocker 2007; Fontana 2010; Kirman 2011; Colander, 
Holt, Rosser 2011; Aoki et al. (Eds.) 2012; Arthur 2013. For a “complexity-based view” of the firm (beyond the 
classic of complex organization, e.g., Simon 1955), e.g., Bloch, Metcalfe 2011; Navarro-Meneses 2015. 
15 With few exemptions, e.g., Durlauf 1997; Salzano, Colander (Eds.) 2007. 
16 Again, with a few exemptions, e.g., Durlauf 2012, 57ff.; Fontana, Terna 2015. However, Durlauf concludes that 
complexity (economics) were just “a set of mathematical tools that can facilitate the modeling of richer economic 
environments than is allowed by the current set of mathematical methods available” (p.68). In contrast, e.g., Fontana 
2010, 593f., considers CE a full-fledged paradigm shift in economics. 
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this paper, we will use the example of a subset of complexity approaches, particularly, as already 
indicated, evolutionary-institutionally interpreted game theory in the evolution-of-cooperation 
tradition (e.g., Elsner 2012), in order to derive a more specific set of policy orientations.17 18 
Among all CA(E)S, we may generally distinguish between those that are “adaptive as a system” 
and those that are “composed of agents that employ adaptive strategies” (Wilson 2014, 3). While 
biological as well as macroeconomic systems tend to be of the first type, microeconomic 
approaches tend to be of the second. We then refer to those CA(E)S that have “large numbers of 
components, often called agents that interact and adapt or learn” (Holland 2006, 1).19 We assume 
that our subset of approaches exemplarily mirrors important mechanisms, resulting properties, 
and critical factors of all CA(E)S. In that more specific area of approaches, we may delve 
somewhat deeper into the implications for complexity policy. 
 
In the evolutionary and institutionalist traditions, some complexity-policy ideas were developed 
well before the financial crisis, with reference to economic complexity and systems analysis (e.g., 
Witt 2003; Elsner 2001, 2005; Hayden 2006). Evolutionary Institutionalists also combined the 
long-standing instrumentalist/pragmatist philosophy and its approach to policy (e.g., Dewey 
1930; Commons 1934; Tool 1979/1985) with a complexity-policy conception into particular 
operative approaches (more below).20 
                                                          
17 Similarly, e.g., Colander, Kupers 2014, 150ff., on “evolutionary and epistemic game theory”, referring to Gintis 
2009. 
18 Note that the mutual integration of “complexity” and “evolution” still is an issue. Not all CA(E)S are modeled as 
evolutionary, but evolutionary modeling is always complex (e.g., Castellacci 2006). But the degree of complexity 
may vary greatly during an evolutionary process, and, e.g., “fitness” may considerably change its content under 
different degrees of complexity (more below). 
19 We will, thus, not consider those CA(E)S that deal with aggregates only and, if they have individual agents, deal 
with more or less representative ones, not explicitly modeled as interacting. We are aware that interesting subsets of 
CA(E)S thus are not considered, such as, e.g., dynamic evolutionary macro models (based on Post-Keynesianism, 
Minsky, Goodwin, and others), models of macroeconomic (systemic) risk, financial interaction and contagion 
models, and others (see, e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2015). 
20 For the so-called Social-Fabric-Matrix approach, Hayden 2006; Natarajan, Elsner, Fullwiler (Eds.) 2009. 
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This paper proceeds as follows: In section 2, we further characterize the relevant subset of 
CA(E)S. In section 3, we discuss some general orientations of a complex adaptive (economic) 
policy [CA(E)P], as received from the previous literature. In section 4, we will assume an 
evolutionary game-theoretic (EGT) perspective and refer to the older Axelrodian approach 
(Axelrod 1984/2006) and its policy implications. In section 5, we will generalize those and list 
more policy implications that can be derived from using game theory in an evolutionary and 
institutional interpretation. In section 6, we combine that perspective together with an 
instrumentalist approach of social valuation into some modern meritorics and, particularly a 
conception of an Interactive/Institutional Policy. Section 7 concludes.21 
 
 
2. Mechanisms and properties of interaction-based evolutionary CA(E)S – A brief 
sketch 
 
For the subset of economic-complexity approaches that we focus on, we will follow a simple 
distinction among antecedences (“structure”), consequences (“process”), and continuing feedback 
and interaction between the two (“circular cumulative causation” and “endogenous structure”). 22 
 
Structures 
                                                          
21 Note that we make some use in this paper of Chpt. 17 of Elsner, Heinrich, Schwardt, The Microeconomics of 
Complex Economies, Amsterdam, San Diego, New York et al.: Elsevier/Academic Press, 2015, 499-527; the chapter 
is entitled “Policy Implications: New Policy Perspectives for Private Agents, Networks, Network Consultants, and 
Public Policy Agencies”. 
22 It has often been counted how many definitions of complexity are in use, and there are many. So we better do not 
select a particular one and stick to it, but focus on these complexity dimensions (similarly, e.g., Fontana 2010, 588f.). 
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In that particular area of CA(E)S that apply EGT and embed it in a larger evolutionary-
institutional interpretation (e.g., Elsner 2012), model structures include, as a baseline: 
 
(1) multiple and (potentially) heterogeneous agents (i.e., with different behavioral options to be 
socially learned and habituated), being directly interdependent and interacting 
 
(2) in different, more or less “intricate” interdependence structures of social (multi-personal) 
interaction problems and individual decision problems. The most-used formal language for this, 
as said, is provided by game theory. So we may think here of different coordination, anti-
coordination, non-coordination, and social-dilemma problems, and other problem and incentive 
structures that are used in lab experiments. Different behavioral options fundamentally generate 
(initial) strong strategic uncertainty, and open a space for different social rules and institutions,23 
particularly when interactions will be indefinitely repeated, in a time horizon that exceeds the 
agents’ practical planning horizons (formally considered as infinite repetition in prisoners’ 
dilemma supergames – PD-SG; see below); 
 
(3) those interdependence types also may be defined on different network topologies, i.e., 
structures of a population to be investigated, with different social or geographical distance and 
neighborhoods, related differential probabilities to interact, and critical consequences for 
decisions across many interactions and for learning behaviors, diffusion processes, general 
performance, segregation, systemic risk and stability, etc. (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2012).24 Network 
                                                          
23 Note that, as coordination and cooperation, so do social rules and social institutions refer to coordination games 
and dilemma games, resp. (for the definitions, e.g., Elsner 2012; also below, section 4). 
24 For the exploding field of economic network analysis as a part of CE, and its significance for CA(E)P, e.g., 
Hollingsworth, Mueller 2008; Boyer 2008; Room 2011, Chpt.11; Ormerod 2012; Richards 2012. Of course, not all 
CA(E)S models do employ network theory. Also, network theory is, of course, not confined to networks of agents, 
12 
 
structures typically are not “complete” with full connectivity, where any agent interacts with all 
others in any given time period with certainty, but display different patterns of local 
neighborhoods in spatial clusters and long-distance relations – exogenously given or emerged in 
an interaction process with aspired “complexity reduction” (below). With this, there are many 
different interaction densities, critical for diffusion and other outcomes. Neighborhoods and 
interaction arenas in general may also be overlapping and staged systems (neighbors of 
neighbors; see below). If agents may die out, get born, learn, change strategies, move within the 
topology in reaction to earlier actions, or differentially replicate in response to their relative 
success, then network structure becomes endogenous.25 
 
Real-world networks, as indicated, typically display combinations of local clusters and long-
distance relations. Most discussed are so-called small-world networks (e.g., Watts, Strogatz 
1998). These show some clustering for more effective local problem-solving (the coordination, 
conformism, and stability dimension), but also a relatively low mean path-length between any 
two agents, ensuring quick and effective long-distance exchange, diffusion and learning (the non-
coordination, non-conformism, and flexibility dimension).26 A small-world property seems to be 
existent in manifold variations in many relatively effective networks in all areas (such as the 
human brain), and some man-made socio-economic systems, such as logistics or planned 
                                                          
let alone to games on networks, although this appears as a particularly dynamic new research area (e.g., Zenou 2012; 
Jackson, Zenou 2015; Jackson, Rogers, Zenou 2015). 
25 Formally, then, we may distinguish among interaction functions, linking an agent’s state to a summary measure of 
the states of all other agents (the game structure), a network specification, determining those summary measures as a 
function of other agents’ states, and an aggregation function, determining how agent-level states collectively 
determine macro-outcomes (Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, Tahbaz-Salehi 2015). 
26 Note that problem-solving clustering may or may not be consistent with homophily, conformism, and resulting 
segregation, which often also may hinder network effectivity and success (e.g., Jackson, Rogers, Zenou 2015). On 
the ubiquitous and notorious stability-flexibility balance and a sometimes related efficacy-flexibility trade-off, e.g., 
Hallsworth 2012, 45f.; Jarman et al. 2015. 
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settlement systems, try to deliberately design it. Thus, obviously, it has some relevance for 
policies as well (more below). 
 
Finally, in most real-world decentralized socio-economic topologies with deep-rooted 
individualist cultures, agents are different in terms of power and status, which is reflected in 
networks by the relative number and quality of relations an agent has, i.e., her centrality. There 
are, thus, a number of different critical “micro” (individual, or “local”) and “macro” (aggregate or 
“global”) network patterns, such as different (distributions of) degrees of centrality and different 
qualitative tie strengths and positions of agents (e.g., a “gatekeeper” position for a local cluster). 
Empirical research since V. Pareto has shown that in complex decentralized socio-economic 
systems with many agents (components or nodes) some self-organization capacity – again, driven 
perhaps by individual aspirations of reducing the complexity of the individual decision situation 
– often leads to a certain size distribution (power, centrality) among agents, as in such diverse 
areas as income (Pareto’s empirical finding), firm size, or settlement (municipality) distributions. 
Typically, many agents have few relations and few have many. And typically for CA(E)S, those 
sizes are distributed in a way that, if we match size classes and numbers of nodes in those size 
classes and scale both logarithmically, we yield falling graphs with an identical curve property at 
all scales (scale-invariance, as mentioned above). Such scale-free networks (e.g., Barabási, Albert 
1999), consequently, have attracted much attention. We may think of stochastic processes that 
generate distributions invariant under different scaling, the phenomenon of self-similarity, with 
repeating patterns at different scales (so-called fractals, see above). Note again that such results, 
obviously, have little to do with optimality, as very large nodes, e.g., most powerful agents, may 
cause problems of network stability or resilience. We will return to policy implications below. 
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Networks, as said, may also be considered overlapping and layered systems, given or emerged as 
such from agents’ interactions, where an agent may interact in different arenas (neighborhoods, 
clusters, or emerged platforms), which may overlap in many respects (with respect to agents, 
goods and other objects, settlement geography, etc.), and may form hierarchies. Policies and the 
system of politics, thus, may have to adapt to adapt to those structures (more below). 
 
Processes 
Formal structures of CA(E)S have been widely analyzed, showing, among others, that the 
boundaries between micro and macro properties blur (e.g., Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, Tahbaz-Salehi 
2015). And, when it comes to evolutionary process and emergent structure, the limits of 
analytical tractability, determinacy, and prediction are quickly touched, while stochastic analysis 
quickly finds itself beyond just network structure and its link level (e.g., Jackson, Rogers, Zenou 
2015; Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, Tahbaz-Salehi 2015), which fundamentally reflects nonlinearities of 
relational structures and the phenomenon of emergence (e.g., Fontana 2010, 591f.). 27 
 
Evolutionary CA(E)S with games on networks in particular deal with continuing interaction 
among agents. The often mixed interests (partially consistent, partially conflicting) then entail 
lasting tensions among agents, as reflected in different anti- and non-coordination and dilemma 
problems. And even in apparently simple and obvious-to-solve coordination problems (those with 
Pareto-different solutions), a collective incapacity to ensure the optimal solution exists, for 
reasons of technical (Arthur 1989) and/or institutional (David 1985) lock-in. This is indicative of 
contradictions between individualistic and collective rationalities and solutions, or the absence of 
                                                          
27 The capacity of emergence is widely considered the distinctive property of complexity science, also coined 
“generative science” (Fontana 2010, 592); also, e.g., Harper, Lewis 2012. 
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(mechanisms to generate some) collective rationality, resp. In such cases, T. Schelling’s idea of 
focal points (Schelling 1960, 57) has provided some ways out for agents involved – and also has 
some policy relevance (see below). 
 
But such unintended consequences of individualistic behavior appear to be pervasive, and 
fallacies of aggregation a resulting methodological feature, in markets with a dominating myopic 
individualistic culture. Technological and/or institutional lock-in, as well as ceremonial 
degenerations of previously instrumental institutions (e.g., Bush 1987; Heinrich, Schwardt 2013; 
Elsner 2012), are known instances of such non-optimality in both reality and theory. 
 
But even if an individualistic culture, enforced by de-regulated markets and their often overly 
high turbulence, could be remediated (in a policy-supported evolutionary cultural process of 
instrumental institutionalization), in any otherwise complex structure and resulting process 
human individuals’ rationality remains bounded as well, as stability and transparency may 
quickly become too little, and “knowability” or calculability of the systems’ dynamics highly 
restricted, given human brains’ capacities. This has been one of the earliest findings of CE, and a 
classic theme since, as developed by one of its pioneers, H. Simon (e.g., Simon 1955). Generally, 
in a formal perspective, already quite simple mathematical structures may generate very complex 
dynamics (e.g., May 1976; Boyer 2008, 738f.; Durlauf 2012, 57ff.). 
 
Thus, for policy, we will have to deal with the issue of proper complexity reduction of individual 
decision situations (see below) – without having any hope, though, to be able – or even to wish – 
to reduce the system complexity so that global “perfect information” and certainty would result. 
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If, in particular, strategies have been interactively learned, adopted, and habituated as 
instrumental rule- and institution-based solutions of coordination and dilemma problems, 
emergent structure takes the form of problem-solving institutional emergence. In systems with 
planning, deliberating and anticipating human agents, rule- and institution-based coordination 
and cooperation do function as complexity reduction for agents. In this way, they relate to some 
homeostasis (equifinality) capacity of the system, holding some variable values within limits and, 
thus, ensuring some continuity and stabilization (e.g., Gilles, Lazarova, Ruys 2014). As said, in 
terms of policy relevance, this may include some evasion of policy measures. CA(E)P, thus, 
needs to be attuned in proper interaction with the interaction processes of the private (see below). 
 
In our context, an example of a low-complexity system will be 2x2 PD-SGs played in a 
population in an EGT view, the evolution-of-cooperation perspective. But proper analysis of 
resulting processes with many strategies, let alone endogenous strategies, was feasible only 
through computer simulations (e.g., Axelrod 1984/2006; Lindgren 1997). 
 
Indefinite recurrence of interactions in a population with many and evolving strategies and a 
replicator mechanism integrated is but a minor aspect of a typical open-ended and sequential 
process over historical time. Such process then typically is not only path-dependent, cumulative, 
and often idiosyncratic (i.e., at instances, so-called phase transitions, it is unpredictable or 
“chaotic”), as said, it also is open-ended with respect to often instable and transitory fixed points 
attained and periodic or non-periodic orbits performed (e.g. Room 2011, Chpt.9). 
 
Related to such unpredictability, CA(E)S also are non-ergodic in the sense that the distribution of 
states they do assume over time is not identical with the distribution of the potential states they 
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basically can assume. This, in turn, relates to the fact that such systems are also “sensitively 
dependent” on initial conditions, which may come to vastly matter during a process (the well-
known “history matters” issue). 
 
What can be recognized from CA(E)S and their agent-based modeling and simulations, then, are 
behavioral patterns of systems (e.g., Room 2011, Chpt.10), an epistemological finding that has 
been long-standing also in the more qualitative strands of evolutionary-institutional  and other 
heterodox economics (e.g., Wilber, Harrison 1978). 
 
We may further integrate individual learning and adaptation algorithms and, in a population of 
agents, determine the relative success of certain rule-based behaviors or strategies and their 
carrier-subpopulations, over a period of time and across encounters with the many different other 
agent types. A full-fledged evolutionary process then accordingly will include, as said, 
differential replication of behavioral types. However, again, evolutionary optimality, in the sense 
of a survival of the fittest, across social environments and time, will not necessarily occur. It 
would require structurally stable and, with this, relatively transparent environmental conditions, 
where a “selection” mechanism has enough time to meliorate the system. However, this is 
typically not the environment of complex dynamic human populations. Particularly, when 
population shares are not only path-dependent and subject to differential replication, but, for 
instance, also subject to first-mover advantages, cumulative power acquisition, or limits to 
growth, situations of a survival of the first, survival of the fattest, or a survival of all, with 
possibly different shares, may occur – all situations of non-optimality.28 
 
                                                          
28 For a general model with similar results, e.g., Nowak 2006, Chpt. 2. 
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Circular cumulative causation and endogenous structure 
Such processes are, of course, not just bottom-up structural emergence (a microfoundation with 
upward causation) at proper meso- or macro-levels,29 but also about reconstitutive downward 
effects (e.g., Hodgson 2002) from emerged structure onto the behavioral options, incentives, and 
evolving patterns of individual agents. Circular cumulative upward and downward mechanisms, 
a basic understanding of the economy in evolutionary institutionalism from Veblen through 
Myrdal till today (e.g., Berger, Elsner 2007), are definitely theoretical and methodological 
modules of CE.30 They endogenize the network structure, and with complex interaction of 
structure and process, we are 
 
“… maturing to a point at which policy implications are emerging … Moving forward, it is our 
hope and expectation that .. (this – W.E.) will greatly aid in the understanding of policies …” 
(Jackson, Rogers, Zenou 2015, 41). 
 
 
3. Some general policy orientations for complex economies from previous literature 
 
“Revising the concept of regulation” 
As said, it is the manifold non-optimality of complex systems’ mechanisms and processes, not 
appropriately reflected by the theory of “market failure” (e.g., Fontana 2012, 232f.), which 
basically opens the space for a proactive and systemic strategy of the public-policy agent. The 
“pervasiveness of unintended consequences” (Wilson 2014, 12) in CA(E)S with individualistic 
cultures and power relations justifies a strong role of policy. 
                                                          
29 For emergence taking place at meso-levels and an approach to meso-economics, e.g., Elsner, Heinrich 2011. 
30 For a full-fledged evolutionary ontology and theory of economic systems, e.g., Dopfer 2005. 
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But also, evolution and complexity suggest a completely different concept of “regulation” than 
mainstream economics has imposed on society. As famous socio-biologist D.S. Wilson argues, 
for a neoclassical and neoliberal economist, “regulation is something imposed by governments, 
and self-organizing processes such as the market are regarded as an absence of regulation”, while 
for a socio-biologist, 
 
“all of the metabolic processes that keep organisms alive and all of the social processes that 
coordinate … [social animals – W.E.] are regulated ... The concept of regulation in economics and 
public policy needs to be brought closer to the biological concept of regulation. The idea of no 
regulation should be regarded as patently absurd but determining the right kind of regulation and 
the role of formal government in regulatory processes are still central topics of inquiry” (Wilson 
2014, 11). 
 
Thus, again, self-organizing capacities of CA(E)S are in no way running counter to a proactive 
role of policy. Rather, it is 
 
“clear that unmanaged cultural evolutionary processes are not going to solve the problems … at 
the scale and in the time that is required, which means that we must become ‘wise managers of 
evolutionary processes’ …” (ibid.). 
 
Then “the selection of self-organizing regulatory processes” (p.12) becomes a major policy task, 
while “moving the economy from an undesirable basin of attraction to a more desirable one” 
(Colander, Kupers 2014, 53) remains the overarching objective. 
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Policy system partly endogenous, partly exogenous 
Note, as said, that public policy is (1) itself a complex system with its own relative structural, 
procedural, and performative strengths and weaknesses, interacting with the CA(E)S, which (2) 
will thus have to be considered at least partly endogenous to the system under scrutiny. This, 
however, does not imply that the policy system cannot itself assume the required higher degree of 
complexity vis-à-vis the CA(E)S (below). We may, rather, also justify “exogenizing” it because 
of its different constitutional mechanism: ideally a unique, uniform, transparent, and centralized 
public discourse and decision-making, ideally well-informed of the complexity of the target 
system (and of its own complexity). This may be attained in spite of its perhaps multi-layered 
structure. With its particular centralized character, some collective rationality, compared to 
individualistic rationalities in the target system, may become effective. 
 
Higher complexity of the control system 
In fact, an early insight from information theory and cybernetics was that the complexity (e.g., 
the number of possible states, or degrees of freedom) of a control system needs to be at least as 
high as the complexity of the targeted system, the so-called Ashby’s Law, where “only variety can 
absorb variety” (Ashby 1956). In order to shift a controlled system into an aimed-at area of 
outcome values (a superior attractor), while dealing with sometimes unpredictable adaptations of 
the system, including avoidance and evasion by agents, or some systemic sticking to an inferior 
attractor, the control system must be able to assume at least as many possible states as the 
controlled one. 
 
In this way, policies towards CA(E)S need to be themselves complex, system- and process-
oriented, with a long-run learning and adaptation perspective – “policy as a collective learning 
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process” (Witt 2003, 81f.). It needs to stick to its clarified and legitimized objectives, while being 
prepared to assume many different states itself. 
 
It appears that this is impossible with a neoliberal minimalist state – ideally confined to a legal 
and court system, to tax and financial-speculation operations, and to police and military actions, 
but de-qualified and run-down otherwise (i.e., in its capacities of goal clarification, long-term 
planning, learning and adaptation, regulative frame-setting, and pursuing a holistic approach 
towards economy, society, and the commons). A political system with reduced democratic-
participatory content, based on an oligopolistic or even duopolistic party system with the-winner-
takes-it-all power incentives and related myopia, it has been argued recently, will not be able to 
solve such major problems (e.g., Fuller 2014) in terms of the reach of the ecological and social 
commons or the long-termism required.31 
 
“Reducing complexity” of individual decision-making 
Regarding complexity and its reduction, we already made the important distinction between the 
complexity of the system and that of the decision situation of individual agents. 
 
Collectivities of interacting agents may generate, carry, and apply social rules and institutions, as 
a force of problem-solving and some self-organizing capacity, and, as said, of complexity 
reduction of their decision situations (e.g., Bloch, Metcalfe, 2011, 85f.). Thus, policy support for 
institutional emergence in CA(E)S of interacting human agents is helps reducing the complexity 
of individual and common or collective decision situations. That complexity may easily 
                                                          
31 For the general neoliberal winner-takes-it-all culture and resulting systemic short-termism, e.g., Rappaport, Bogle 
2011; Aspara et al. 2014. 
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overwhelm, as mentioned, the cognitive capacities of agents and run counter to their capabilities 
to orient themselves, act, or innovate. Supported institutional emergence, thus, may de-block and 
free common and collective action from the incapability of isolated individualistic agents, and 
enable and empower them. 
 
The basic principle involved in such institutional emergence and its public support seems to be 
some tacit contrât social (J.J. Rousseau), a collective self-commitment (for some time), and the 
corresponding public assurance of individuals. This may limit some behavioral options and 
“flexibility”, but also turbulence, thus sometimes reducing, sometimes increasing efficacy 
through more stability, which may increase transparency and individual empowerment.32 
Therefore, inserting such (supposedly superior) collective rationality is unavoidably ambiguous, 
as argued before. It may help the system to settle in aspired value areas, stabilize and improve. It 
may, however, also provide problem solution for a limited period only, and may then lead into a 
lock-in or ceremonial encapsulation. 
 
Further, reducing complexity at the individual and group levels, and thus perhaps stabilizing the 
system and reducing its volatility, may be more or less successful at different phases of the 
system. CA(E)S may be more or less robust or sensitive vis-à-vis policy measures at different 
times and phases. If the system is in a “basin of attraction”, small policy interventions to redirect 
it may have little effect.  
 
In any case, the system itself may remain highly complex, when individual decision situations 
become less complex. Reducing the system’s complexity, if this were a policy objective at all, 
                                                          
32 See above on the efficacy-flexibility trade-off. 
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might require quite different measures and face quite different difficulties and system reactions. 
Maintaining the system’s resilience, for instance, may require that diversification rates, in the 
long run, remain ahead of selection, standardization, and institutionalization processes.33 
 
On the role of calculation and simulations for policy 
What has been said for analyzing CA(E)S has a bearing on the qualification of CA(E)P. While 
the calculation requirements remain higher for CA(E)S than for simplistic systems, 
indeterminacy and unpredictability remain as well. Population dynamics, e.g., easily becomes 
analytically intractable. And while computer simulations, of course, consist of regular 
mathematical operations, simple in their elementary algorithms, system complexity may easily 
translate into computational complexity, requiring calculation time that may easily go to infinity 
(e.g., Fontana 2010, 588ff.). But proper modeling and calibrations of simulations may 
nevertheless help detecting mechanisms, critical factors, and system-behavior patterns. 
 
For instance, an evolutionary policy approach requires evolutionary analysis (e.g., Pelikan 2003; 
Witt 2003). And in an evolutionary-institutional approach, e.g., Hayden (2006) developed a 
Social-Fabric-Matrix approach to policy analysis in order to investigate the dynamic network 
structure among agents, institutions, and value systems, with their sequential input-output 
relations as directed graphs. This helps making transparent and pursuing policy actions 
throughout the socio-economic system.34 
 
                                                          
33 On system resilience as a policy goal, e.g., Colander, Kupers 2014, 199ff. 
34 Also, e.g., Natarajan, Elsner, Fullwiler (Eds.) 2009; for evolutionary-institutional system dynamics, e.g., Radzicki 
2009; for the transformation of system-dynamic models into directed graphs, as done in the social-fabric matrix 
approach, and subsequent application of social-network analysis, e.g., Schoenenberger, Schenker-Wicki 2015 (more 
below). 
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Note that cause and effect between the control and target systems are no longer simple, 
unidirectional, and structurally constant but interdependent and structurally changing. For 
instance, a reversal of an earlier policy will usually not generate reverse effects on the target 
system. Nor will the strengths of effects of identical measures be the same over time. The ability 
of economic forecasting, therefore, will be generally reduced and context-dependent. Although 
formal methods to be applied will be more demanding (dynamical system analysis, system 
dynamics, Social Network Analysis, ABM, and simulations), forecasting to the point and 
technocratic illusions of easy “manageability” will be infeasible. For instance, under path-
dependence, “in order to understand policy options you must understand the past, which vastly 
complicates the analysis” (Colander, Kupers 2014, 54). 
 
Policy interventions, therefore, have been said to necessarily remain “nonalgorithmic” in many 
instances (Velupillai 2007).35 In other words, the problems of analytical intractability, often 
incalculability, relative indeterminacy, and more difficult predictability make policy measures not 
always exactly calculable and not fully determined on the basis of calculation. “Nonalgorithmic” 
action will be needed to move the system into an aspired (superior) basin of attraction with 
aimed-at outcome values.36 
 
But this, in turn, does by no means absolve CA(E)P from the requirement of assuming a 
proactive role (e.g., Durlauf 2012, 62ff.) or making the best of its “algorithmic” underpinnings, 
where applicable.37 
                                                          
35 Nevertheless, a new debate on new opportunities of calculation-based political planning, given modern computer 
capacities, seems to emerge; e.g., Cockshott 2015. 
36 Kauffman et al. 2015, in a biology-inspired neo-Schumpeterian interpretation of CA(E)S, even conclude that 
“unprestatable” and non-algorithmic system change prevents the provision of clear policies at all. 
37 E.g., Fontana and Terna (2015) suggest that combining empirical network analysis with ABM may qualify 
complexity policy. 
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Further “Complexity Hints for Economic Policy” and the “Art of Public Policy” 
Salzano and Colander (Eds., 2007) have been pioneering on the policy implications of economic 
complexity. Among their authors, Velupillai, as mentioned, clarified the limits of calculability 
(above; Velupillai 2007, also 2005). Policy recommendations of CE, he argued, will be less 
certain, more “inductive”, and more acting on the long-run temporal dimension. More degrees of 
freedom and some undecidability, then, require a basic 
 
“change in the worldview that is currently dominant in policy circles” (Velupillai 2007, 275). 
 
Such indeterminacy reminds of what was already implied in the Theory of the Second Best above 
and also justifies Colander’s and Kupers’ (2014) dictum of a complexity-based “art of public 
policy”. 
 
As another instance of a specific “complexity hint” for policy, Gallegati, Kirman and Palestrini 
(2007) showed that system stabilization under power-law structures (see above) may have to 
control “idiosyncratic volatility” caused by individual volatility in the highest classes of the 
power-law distribution of firm sizes. They conclude to propose an apparently traditional policy 
orientation: a reduction of firm centrality and concentration through reducing certain overly 
strong legal protections (namely of intellectual property rights). We will return to the policy 
implications of network structure and volatility below. 
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Against the background of such basic orientations for CA(E)P, we will have a closer look in the 
following at a simple model, as an exemplary exploration to advance some more specific 
complexity-oriented policy orientations. 
 
 
4. The simple example of political frame-setting for institutional emergence in 
Prisoners’-Dilemma supergames 
 
For the simple example, which, however, has exemplary policy relevance, we refer to Axelrod’s 
(1984/2006) EGT-approach to the evolution-of-cooperation in PD-SGs. It was a simple formal 
reflection of his multi-strategy tournament simulations and has triggered a surge in the use of the 
PD and of PD-SG approaches for three decades. Too often, however, the PD is just taken for 
granted. But we have elaborated on the ubiquity and everyday relevance of social-dilemma 
structures elsewhere (e.g., Elsner, Heinrich 2009). 
 
Axelrod’s simple formal reflection 
Following the well-known approach, the starting point is the PD normal form: 
 
a, a d, b 
b, d c, c 
with b>a>c>d and a > (d + b)/2. 
 
Axelrod’s approach to the superiority (i.e., non-invadability or evolutionary stability, ES) of 
cooperation in a population playing 2x2-PD-SGs applies one of the usual ES-conditions of EGT, 
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comparing defectors’ (ALL-D) yield against tit-for-tat-cooperators (TFT) with what cooperators 
attain playing against their kind38: 
 
PTFT/TFT = a + a + ²a +... 
a 
 = –––––  ; 
1- 
 
PALL-D/TFT = b + c + ²c +... 
c 
  = ––––– + b – c  . 
1- 
 
ES follows the criterion, whether a population of cooperators cannot (or can) be invaded by 
defectors and thus be an evolutionarily stable strategy (or not). One of the ES-conditions (the one 
that Axelrod used) is: 
 
PTFT/TFT ! PALL-D/TFT, 
thus a/(1-δ) >! c/(1-δ) + b - c 
→  ! (b-a)/(b-c), 
 
a logical condition for the institution of (conditional) cooperation (i.e., TFT behavior) to prevail 
in a population (i.e., not to be invadable). 
 
                                                          
38 TFT, as known, starts cooperating and then does what the other agent did last interaction. It is the simplest 
cooperative strategy in a PD-SG, which reflects a sequence of interactions (with one period memory) and is 
responsive and, thus, not always strictly dominated (like ALL-C, of course, is). 
28 
 
Note that cooperation, to solve the social-dilemma in a Pareto-optimal way, through a sequential 
interaction process with social learning, in an evolutionary-institutional interpretation, would be 
fully feasible only as an institution. As said, this is a social rule plus endogenous sanction 
(exerted through the credible threat of a so-called trigger strategy, such as TFT, to defect upon 
defection and in this way punish the defector), which prevents opportunism and keeps agents 
from chasing after their short-run maximum. Logically, it cannot be attained by “hyper-rational” 
(short-run) maximization (in a one-shot attitude), but must become habituated and pursued 
“semi-consciously” as long as there is no reason to assume that others intend to exploit. 
 
The major theoretical question, and problem of proper modeling, then translates into the 
possibility of the emergence of such a culture of longer-run rationality (and related longer-run 
maximization calculation, as reflected by the current-capital values of infinite geometric series of 
payoffs, the so-called single-shot solution). The longer time horizon is reflected by a high 
discount factor , or low time preference, and is equivalent to the probability, in any particular 
interaction, to meet the current interaction partner again. 
 
Also note that the single-shot payoffs, when the PD is solved, transform the PD matrix into a less 
intricate coordination-game matrix of the stag-hunt type (with two Pareto-different Nash 
equilibria). A general management and policy perspective for the superior solution of that stag-
hunt structure, then, was presented early by A. Sen (1967). In a context of an independent and 
endogenous national development and related collective saving effort of a population to build a 
national capital and investment base, he introduced into a stag-hunt game the idea of a public 
assurance that all other agents will also contribute (i.e., will forego current consumption and 
increase saving for the national capital stock to make the next generation benefit). Such public 
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assurance is considered equivalent with an informal contrât social, a general trust building that 
others will contribute as well (therefore it was termed “assurance” game), providing a 
Schellingian focal point for the Pareto-superior coordination (see above). 
 
But in any sequential interaction, an existing dilemma structure still continues to exist, with its 
dominating incentive to defect. As long as agents are uncertain and myopic, playing series of one-
shots, the direction and outcome of a process, therefore, will be open. The solution may remain 
completely blocked and the system caught in the one-shot Nash equilibrium. If the institutional 
solution emerges, it may also be very time-consuming. Finally, an emerged institution may be 
fragile and prone to backslide and later breakdown, depending on the evolution of population 
shares of cooperators and defectors, among others. Thus, there is much reason and space for 
policy support of the process of emergence. 
 
As indicated, and first shown by Axelrod, this solution is accessible indeed for policy. It points to 
two complexes of policy objectives and measures: 
 
(1) improving the incentive (payoff) structure in favor of cooperation, e.g., rewarding 
cooperation, weakening the social dilemma, making the structure gradually less intricate and 
difficult to solve; and 
 
(2) promoting the recognition of interdependence (“recognized interdependence”, in fact, an 
older institutionalist finding; e.g., Bush 1999) and, particularly, the awareness of the common 
future, i.e., enlarging the time horizon through a cultural learning process (Axelrod: „enlarging 
the shadow of the future“; which also is an older institutionalist issue, extensively dealt with as 
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futurity by Commons 1934) – a longer-run calculation as an enlightened self-interest, supporting 
a culture of reciprocity. 
 
Axelrod also gave policy examples for the latter, less obvious issue, such as generating, and 
involving agents in, series of common projects that overlap over time so that agents always have 
a perspective to “meet again” (a high value of ).39 We have further elaborated on these two 
complexes and an objectives-instruments continuum involved (see below), and provided a real-
world case study elsewhere (Elsner 2001). Among others, we showed how regional networking 
on common and collective issues may serve the second complex, and how the first complex 
(weakening the PD incentive structure) 40 may easily be addressed through non-pecuniary payoffs 
as well (such as early or selective provision of critical information). 
 
A designer’s perspective on the “single-shots solution” 
A “designer’s” perspective on such policy support of collective problem-solving would focus on 
increasing expectations “to meet again” (δ↑) and/or weakening the fierceness of the dilemma (b↓, 
a↑), so that the single-shot condition (the inequality above) will hold with greater probability. 
This can be illustrated as follows: 
 
δ↑ >! [(b↓-a↑)↓ / (b↓-c↓↓)↑]↓ . 
 
                                                          
39 Note that this must not be the identical agent. Given agency capacities of monitoring or reputation-chain building 
and usage, this must just be a “knowing” agent, who is informed about my earlier behavior. 
40 We do, of course, not assume that in reality we can isolate and clear-cut static normal-form games and derive 
clear-cut behavioral and policy conclusions from them. But we assume that we can identify, if only temporarily, 
certain basic incentive structures and attenuate those that run counter to complexity and volatility reductions. 
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We may qualify this illustration algebraically, writing the inequality as an equation and by this 
changing the earlier minimum δ into  𝛿𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡.: 
 
𝛿𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡. = (𝑏 − 𝑎) (𝑏 − 𝑐)  =  1 − [(𝑎 − 𝑐) (𝑏 − 𝑐)] =  (𝑏 − 𝑎)
1(𝑏 − 𝑐)−1⁄ ,⁄  
 
with the marginal conditions: 
 
𝜕𝛿𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡.
𝜕(𝑏−𝑎)
 =  1 (𝑏 − 𝑐) ⁄ >  0                 (1) 
𝜕𝛿𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡.
𝜕(𝑏−𝑐)
=  − (𝑏 − 𝑎) (𝑏 − 𝑐)2⁄  <  0                (2) 
 
and particularly for the individual variables: 
 
𝜕𝛿𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡.
𝜕𝑏
 =  (𝑎 − 𝑐) (𝑏 − 𝑐)2⁄  >  0                (3) 
𝜕𝛿𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡.
𝜕𝑎
=  1 (𝑐 − 𝑏) ⁄ <  0                 (4) 
𝜕𝛿𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡.
𝜕𝑐
 =  (𝑏 − 𝑎) (𝑏 − 𝑐)2⁄  >  0 .                (5) 
 
This little exercise somewhat clarifies the policy implication re. the incentive structure. Ad (1): 
Reduce the costs of common cooperation, (b-a), so that the requirement, in terms of the length of 
the individual time horizon and calculation period (δcrit.), for the dilemma to be solved through a 
calculated long-run superiority of common cooperation, decreases as well. In this way, the 
probability that the dilemma will be solved by the agents will increase, as the single-shot 
condition will be easier met, c.p. The requirement for δcrit. for a solution then could even be 
reduced, c.p., and the problem be easier solved anyway. Similarly, ad (2): Increase the costs of 
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common defection, (b-c), i.e., increase the frustration (the endogenous potential punishment) for 
defecting agents. Further, and more obviously, for the individual payoffs, e.g., ad (3): Reduce the 
temptation to defect, b; ad (4): increase the reward of common cooperation, a; and, ad (5): 
reduce c (and if b is reduced as well, then reduce c even more than b, in order to meet condition 
(2)). Do this in order to make the institution of cooperation ever more superior in the population 
and thus to support agents when learning to solve social dilemmas. 
 
Again, the fierceness of the PD may be attenuated, e.g., by financial subsidies or non-financial 
benefits for common cooperation, to favor the collective-good production. But the structure must 
not be eliminated as such, as this might be a rather costly entertainment for the public agent. Such 
a solution would also be a static one, rather than informally acquired and habituated in a process 
– and theoretically trivial as well. Rather, as already discussed above, the private agents still need 
to be held liable for their obvious individual interests in the collective solution (indicated by the 
payoffs a), and have to correspondingly contribute. And their contribution needs to be 
intrinsically learned and emerge in an adaptive process among themselves – rather than being 
imposed (or provided on a red carpet) by the public agent. This stresses the fact that the system 
and the public support for its intended adaptation, through the tools related to δ and the payoff 
structure, are gradual issues. 
 
Those gradual changes of the incentive structure through public policy, relative to δ, may indeed, 
in an evolutionary process, at some threshold values, de-block individualistic lock-in (i.e., the 
one-shot Nash equilibrium) or accelerate and stabilize the process of institutional emergence. 
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That single-shot solution may easily be integrated (with PD-SGs played in populations) with 
explicitly modeled population size (e.g., Elsner, Heinrich 2009). Then, total maximum 
population, minimum critical population share of cooperators, and even the maximum carrier-
group size of the institution may be determined. Size, thus, can be shown to be another critical 
factor for the probability of structural emergence. 41 
 
 
5. More policy implications from the “deep structure” of the socio-economy: Game-
theoretic and network considerations in an evolutionary-institutional perspective 
 
“Framework” approach 
The example above reflects a more general principle of CA(E)P, inferable from a broader set of 
game-theoretical and agent-based analyses: While the market, if not strictly regulated, is subject 
to system(at)ic failure, self-degeneration, and self-annihilation, the public agent, if properly 
legitimized and qualified (in a proper combination of participative democracy and 
hierarchical/bureaucratic realization of decisions) , might be able to create and implement basics 
of a long-run collective rationality, better collective-action capacity, and control of the 
decentralized private system to mitigate such systemic failure. However, there is no room in CE 
for claiming, even for a sophisticated and qualified public agent, “to know everything” or “to 
know better” in all contexts and dynamics of the eco-socio-economic system. Endogenously, and 
sometimes very quickly, changing structures and behaviors of the CA(E)S, rather, would 
basically require the policy agent to make use also of the “knowledge of the system” (but not at 
all of “markets” only). This implies, in the first instance, some reduced policy vision, as 
                                                          
41 For an overview of the size dimension in economics, e.g., Elsner, Heinrich, Schwardt 2015, Chpt. 14. 
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mentioned before, which we now can qualify as a policy orientation towards specific frame-
setting, letting the system and its agents do their part and adapt. 
 
Such framework approach, using an interactive relation of different bodies of knowledge and 
action (yet to be specified), has also been advocated, but somewhat misleadingly called an 
“activist laissez-faire policy”, by Colander, Kupers (2014, 214ff.), called political stewardship by 
others (e.g., Beinhocker 2012; Hallsworth 2012; Colander, Kupers 2014, 240ff.). It is certainly 
also consistent with what Colander, Kupers (2014, 186ff., 195ff.) called a “norm influencing role 
for government”, “designed to influence the rules and tone of the social game” (p.186). Then 
government may become indeed “a means through which individuals solve collective problems” 
(ibid.). 
 
Analytical prerequisites of complexity policy 
But at the same time, of course, policy also needs to always be prepared to learn from the 
system’s reaction and further path – an “agile decision-making in a turbulent world” (Room 
2011), which, obviously, is much more demanding for the policy system than all we know from 
the currently dominating policy approach. 
 
CA(E)P, against this background, includes the task of identifying and analyzing the components, 
mechanisms, and critical factors that generate the visible processes, i.e., the (1) different 
incentive structures agents are involved in, their kinds and quantitative strengths (degrees of 
“intricacy”), (2) arenas and networks (given or emerged), their sizes and structures, (3) relative 
collective goods to be produced (or commons to be reproduced) in those arenas/networks by 
forms of coordination and cooperation, (4) the deficiencies of their private social provision 
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processes, (5) social and political objectives, i.e., the public interest in the collective goods and 
commons, to be clarified in a proper participative process, (6) the private interests in the solution, 
i.e., the payoffs agents get for the solution, in order to be able to call them in to contribute 
accordingly, and (6) relevant critical factors, intervention areas and complexes of tools and 
measures. 
 
Some more specific orientations, objectives, tools, and measures 
(1) To resume our findings so far, major orientations, tools, and measures are the following: 
 increasing the awareness of interdependence with the private agents; 
 increasing futurity, i.e., improving private agents’ time horizons and future 
expectations of cooperation of other agents, including expectations “to meet the same 
again (or a “knowing” agent) next interaction”; e.g., committing agents in 
overlapping projects that generate the collective goods both privately and publicly 
aspired; gradually increasing the discount factor this way will increase the probability 
of cooperative/coordinated solutions, yielded in myriads of interactions when agents 
aspire to improve in the long run; 
 gradually improving the incentive structures from fierce to less fierce (from intricate 
to less intricate), without necessarily changing the kind of incentive structure, if this 
would require expensive pecuniary incentives; 
 developing proper interaction arenas, and supporting emergent cooperation 
platforms of proper sizes; e.g., supporting local, regional, national, and global 
collective goods and commons through “structural” (industrial, regional, …) policies; 
shaping proper “meso”-sizes to increase solution capacities; 
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 caring for appropriate network structures; e.g., support small-world properties, while 
avoiding too much centrality and power (too many connections) for few agents;42 put 
reversely: when regulating connectivity structures, and in particular reducing 
centrality degrees, the small-world property of networks should not be destroyed; 
 generating structures of properly overlapping and layered arenas and platforms, 
according to the objective structures of interdependence around the (potential) 
collective goods and commons. 
 
(2) We will briefly discuss, and add some references to these policy orientations. Note that 
favorable results always depend on whole constellations of such critical factors, which, in turn, 
obviously overlap. 
 
 “Improving” incentive structures, assuring, and supporting “focuses”, helping 
agents to converge on superior coordination options: For instance, in transformed 
PD-SGs, i.e., in coordination structures of the “stag-hunt” type (or Arthur’s 
technology choice with network technologies), a public assurance may work to 
create focuses for the Pareto-superior coordination (see on Schelling above; recently, 
e.g., McCain 2009). 
 
 Promoting recognition of interdependence, strengthening “futurity” and enlarging 
time horizons: In approaches that include population size, meso-size of arenas, 
platforms, groups, or networks, with greater mean proximity, neighborhood, density, 
and probability to “meet again”, may reduce the complexity of the decision situation 
                                                          
42 This applies to the upper levels of power-law distributions, making them more even, and their graphs steeper. 
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of agents and thus plays a favorable role for emerging coordination and cooperation. 
Many theoretical, analytical, empirical, and simulation approaches have confirmed, 
over all, that smaller groups improve the quality of decision-making in realistic 
complex environments (e.g., Richards 2012; Elsner, Schwardt 2013, 2014; Kao, 
Couzin 2014). Better recognition of longer-run interdependence and easier 
institutional emergence might thus be generally promoted through systems of layered 
and overlapping meso-sized interaction arenas. Expecting to “meet the same again” 
or “to meet someone who knows” interrelates with the awareness of a common future 
and the time horizon (e.g., Jennings 2005; Hayden 2006). As said, this may support a 
socially learned and habituated culture of another, long-run rationality aspiring 
improvement (with or without opportunities of explicit calculation). 
 
 Reducing volatility, turbulence, and a disembedding mobility: Reducing complexity 
of the decision structures of individual agents also may, under the above 
constellation, favor private collective-good production and problem-solving through 
institutionalized coordination and cooperation, in consistence with public objectives 
(i.e., not at the expense of third agents). It relates to increasing transparency and 
oversight, reducing volatility and turbulence for the individuals, in order to provide 
the time required to learn, adapt, and stabilize expectations and relations (e.g., 
Houser et al. 2014; Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, Tahbaz-Salehi, 2015). Another surprising 
and often counter-intuitive implication – running counter mainly established 
neoliberal dogmas, but making sense within an evolutionary-institutional game-
theoretic perspective – is that such social-capital building requires the reduction of 
current levels of enforced and dis-embedding mobility, as a dimension of a perceived 
38 
 
overly high degree of complexity and turbulence (e.g., Glaeser et al. 2002; Room 
2011, Chpt.12). In a similar vein, the social costs of territorial uprooting have been 
analyzed (e.g., Solari, Gambarotto 2014). Similarly, it has been shown that under 
higher environmental volatility the reaction of CA(E)S may be to switch into higher 
rigidity, as agents cannot properly organize search and learning any longer. The 
system then may slow down in the longer run (e.g., Vega-Redondo 2013). Such 
results are shared by a large recent organizational and network literature, and they 
shed light on the counterproductive petrifactions in response to overly intensive de-
regulation and “globalized flexibility”.43 A large literature of network analyses has 
emerged, particularly against the background of the financial crisis 2008ff., relating 
network structure and size/power structure with volatility, fluctuations, and 
vulnerability of networks. It basically supports the idea of regulating connectivity 
structures, and particularly reducing high-level power positions, in an effort to 
stabilize networks and increase their resilience (see Gallegati, Kirman, Palestrini 
2007 above, and, e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2012). In other words, network structures 
should be somewhat stabilized. 
 
 Increasing transparency and complete information, agent capability, and time for 
learning: Overlapping with the above, strengthening agents’ capacity to appropriately 
deal with more or less intricate common and collective problem-structures further 
requires to provide them with “complete information” on their interaction, i.e., with a 
basic knowledge of the character of their interdependence structure (game type). 
                                                          
43 We have argued elsewhere that in very large anonymous and/or highly turbulent populations with random partner 
change, agents would tend to stick to a PD-SG with the same partner as long as possible, provided this is part of their 
agency capacity (Elsner, Heinrich 2009). 
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Further, providing sufficient time for the social learning of proper solutions also 
relates – besides public information and assurance, recognized interdependence, and 
learned futurity – to strengthening agents’ capabilities to memorize, monitor, build 
reputation, use reputation chains, and select partners in populations, the agents of 
which interact sufficiently often, even if in different problems and on different 
network structures. In game-theoretic approaches with such agency capacities and 
size included, it may be critical to support agents to search and experiment with 
behavioral innovation in order to generate the cooperative minimum critical masses 
required, to make cooperation paying, superior, survive, and spread (e.g., Axelrod 
1984/2006; Elsner, Heinrich 2009). 
 
 Information openness, multiple-path creation, and windows of opportunity: Emerged 
institutions may degrade into abstract norms and ceremonial structures, removed 
from solving the original problem and based, for instance, on differential power and 
related increasing inequality of cooperation gains (e.g., Elsner 2012).44 Restoring 
agents’ problem-solving capacity and, with this, promoting institutional adaptation 
and emergence of new, more appropriate institutions, then will require some break-
out from institutional lock-in (e.g., David 1984; Dolfsma, Leydesdorff 2009). Such 
break-out, in turn, would require some information openness, i.e., open basic 
innovation and the promotion, if possible, of interoperability among different 
simultaneous path options. But such openness, interoperability, and deliberate multi-
standard policies may not only be counterproductive, as long as the unique technical 
                                                          
44 The evolutionary-institutional issue of “ceremonial dominance” can be modeled as a series of overlapping 
dilemma games with sub-optimal short-run outcomes (e.g., Heinrich, Schwardt 2013). 
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and behavioral standard is coordinating and problem-solving (as argued so far), but 
also mostly infeasible. It has been shown that there are critical technological and 
institutional preconditions, so that such policy often becomes feasible only in critical 
time windows, dependent on particular phases of the system (e.g., Heinrich 2013; 
Elsner, Heinrich, Schwardt 2015, Chpt. 15). 
 
 Network structure and size: Local clustering and global exchange of experience: The 
above may coincide with certain topologies, e.g., with arena and platform size, 
proximity and interaction density, and a certain network structure. Generally, 
 
“The more knowledge we have of how people are connected on the relevant network (…) the 
more chance a policy has of succeeding” (Ormerod 2012, 37). 
 
For instance, while Gallegati, Kirman, and Palestrini (2007) pointed out the problem 
of scale-free networks with their potentially volatile upper parts (see above), Watts 
(1999, Ch. 8), in a game-theoretic approach to dilemmas played on networks, 
confirmed a small-world characteristic of topologies to be particularly effective (see 
above on Watts, Strogatz 1998). The policy implication would be to support a 
balance of “meso”-sized clustering and some far-reaching (“global”) 
interconnections. 
 
 Favoring equality: In a game-theoretic perspective, S.P. Hargreaves Heap (1989) 
concluded that favoring equality among agents is a general policy orientation to be 
derived from game theory. In fact, it appears from many formal analyses that 
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symmetrical incentive structures (games) are less intricate, easier to solve for agents, 
and more stable in a longer-run perspective. 45 Asymmetric structure, in contrast, may 
increase intricacy and volatility, through continuing redistribution battles, in the long-
run, thus perhaps distracting agents’ resources from the very problem-solving, i.e., 
from creation of value rather than redistribution of value already created.46 
 
 
6. Complex adaptive economic policy: “Framework” approach and “new meritorics” – 
Outline of an “interactive policy” 
 
Framework approach again 
To change critical factors of the social interaction process and the system’s motions through 
policy intervention, a basic orientation derived from the above has been a framework approach. 
This maintains space for the system’s adaptation, even at the risk that this includes evading the 
policy measures. The rationale behind this is that interactively learned, habituated and 
institutionalized solutions should be more effective in the long run than solutions directly 
prescribed, or provided for them as a free-lunch by the public agent. An informally 
“enculturated” behavioral solution should be more stable and perhaps more effective than if, for 
instance, policy directly dissolved a dilemma structure as such (making the aspired cooperation 
                                                          
45 For experimental support of more equal payoffs favoring voluntary collective-good contribution, e.g., Kesternich, 
Lange, Sturm 2014; for games on networks, Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, Tahbaz-Salehi 2015 conclude that more equal 
distributions among agents, generally, increase macroeconomic performance. 
46 This applies for 2x2 normal-form games even if the formal analysis provides equilibria with asymmetric payoffs 
for the agents as, e.g., in coordination games of the battle-of-the-sexes type. In anti-coordination games with 
asymmetric payoffs (e.g., chicken/hawk-dove type), long-run stability is dubious, and a population may split into 
different sub-cultures (strategies), rather than uniquely solving public-good problems. In non-coordination games 
(e.g., zero-sum games), policy may need to mitigate the resulting extreme distribution struggle by changing the 
interdependence structure as such. Note that formal solutions through mixed strategies are instable in coordination 
games with asymmetric payments and clearly sub-optimal in anti-coordination games with asymmetric payments. 
But again, we do not purport 2x2 normal forms to be easily identifiable in CA(E)S. 
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and production of the collective good the individualistically dominant behavior, with perhaps 
high monetary subsidies for cooperation). In the latter case, the agents’ new behavior would not 
really be learned and institutionalized, but still part of their previous short-run culture. Such “big” 
public solution would not be just theoretically trivial but also static (non-process-oriented). 
 
Such framework approach, then, also provides a clearer definition of the relative private and 
public interests, responsibilities, and contributions (in contrast to often fuzzy Public-Private 
Partnerships so much en vogue under the neoliberal regime, where the state often just provides 
public wealth and guarantees for new profit opportunities for private investors).47 
 
In a game-theoretic perspective, the private clearly have positive individualistic incentives and 
interests to generate the collective good, and, thus, their problem, and the policy problem, is to 
deal just with the difference to the short-run extra benefit for unilateral defection (which, 
however, is highly uncertain among “clever” agents). Thus, the private may be drawn on and 
committed to produce the collective good themselves – even though with some specific public 
“framework” support. 
 
Social evaluation: New meritorics and the “negotiated economy” 
The operative logic of the “framework” approach is that the policy agent needs to evaluate the 
outcomes of the private social-interaction process: What are the relevant (and politically aspired) 
collective goods, and what are the deficiencies of the process and outcomes of the decentralized 
individualistic interactions? Why and how are the latter perhaps (1) completely blocked, (2) too 
                                                          
47 Note also that this approach is clearer, too, than the celebrated approach of “libertarian paternalism”, using 
nudges as a political strategy (Thaler, Sunstein 2003, 2008). The latter does not seem to provide theoretical 
clarification and to reflect system complexity (for a critique, e.g., Colander, Kupers 2014, 167ff.). 
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time-consuming, or (3) too fragile? A social evaluation of such multifariously deficient process 
and outcomes (with “market failure” included) is required. That is, the public dimension of, and 
interest in, any collective good needs to be identified and evaluated. 
 
The outcomes of spontaneous, decentralized processes, particularly in an individualistic culture, 
where de-regulated markets are involved, thus, need to be evaluated, according to some “higher” 
collective rationality. And the criteria are the (1) degree of uncertainty of emergence, (2) time 
requirement for emergence, and (3) degree of fragility of emergence. Public policy then is to be 
oriented to (1) unlock/de-block, (2) accelerate, and (3) stabilize structural emergence, i.e., the 
emergence (production process) of the common or collective good, which is a public objective 
and public good as well, and, with this, economic improvement and development in a broad 
sense. 
 
In terms of a goods classification, the (1) initial (neoclassical) collective good, ideally infeasible 
through “private production”, may, in a CA(E)S, assume the character of a (2) private good in the 
particular sense that it might emerge in an interactive evolutionary-institutional process of self-
organization, and then become a (3) merit good (according to the classic understanding of 
Musgrave 1959) through a social and political evaluation. The original merit-good criteria “price” 
and “quantity” (Musgrave) will, in a CA(E)S context, have to be fundamentally extended by the 
above-mentioned criteria derived from deficient complex process. In this new context, we may 
speak of a new meritorics (similarly already Musgrave 1987; also Ver Eecke 1998, 2007, 2008; 
Elsner 2001). 
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This policy conception can be considered not just “framework”-oriented, but particularly (1) 
double-interactive, as it, in definable ways, interactively relates to the private interaction system. 
Thus, we have termed it Interactive Policy earlier (e.g., Elsner 2001). Traditional perspectives on 
the economy as a machine, in contrast, have required and promoted dichotomic governments 
between “no government” (if “markets work”) and fully centralized bureaucracy (if “markets” 
fail and governments have to act “as if” they were “the market”) (Ormerod 2012, 37).Further, this 
policy may be considered (2) institutional policy, since it works in a perspective to support the 
agents’ efforts to reduce the complexity of their decision conditions, reduce excessive volatility 
etc., and solve common and collective problems better by generating basic social rules and 
institutions. Thus, a new kind of private-public interrelation may be established: Setting specific 
framework conditions in favor of an easier, faster, and more stable coordination/cooperation, but 
leaving the system sufficient degrees of freedom to adapt. 
 
To that effect, the state or policy-agent needs to be particularly strong and qualified – and this 
may include being, in more elaborated ways, democratic and participatory, as this may 
strengthen values, objective clarification, and commitment. The policy agent then needs to 
become able to define, clarify, adapt, and maintain social values, policy objectives, target areas, 
and tools. This is also what the “pragmatist” policy conception (Dewey 1930), with its 
conception of a discretionary economy and policy, its instrumental value principle (e.g., Tool 
1979, 1994), and its conception of a participatory negotiated economy (e.g., Commons 1934; 
Ramstad 1991; Nielsen 1992; Hayden 2006; Hodgson 2012) has always been about.48 
 
                                                          
48 On the role of democracy for complexity policy, also, e.g., Colander, Kupers 2014, 55, passim. 
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The approach may also work with qualitative rather than just pecuniary complexes of 
instruments, such as supporting agents’ futurity (see above), certain preferential and early 
information through the public agent as a “reward” for mutual cooperation in specific program 
and project areas (e.g., in building common location factors of regional firms such as jointly used 
“soft” infrastructures etc.; e.g., Elsner 2001; Richards 2012). In any case, as mentioned, it may 
already be effective with only gradually increased policy impulses (e.g., subsidizing cooperation 
only in a relatively limited way may gradually increase the probability of problem-solving). 
 
Therefore, it also can be considered a cheaper and leaner policy approach as compared to the full 
public production of public goods or a full subsidization of cooperative behavior to make it the 
individualistically dominant behavior (similarly, e.g., Colander, Kupers 2014, 280). 
 
Learning, goals clarification and adaptation, and the blurred boundaries between objectives 
and tools 
Furthermore, in a Myrdalian policy tradition, with unfolding knowledge of the policy maker 
about the system, the private agents and their evolving preferences, (1) policy objectives may 
become continuously clarified and adapted, and (2) a clear-cut static hierarchical means-ends 
dichotomy becomes blurred, while means may turn out to have dimensions of ends and v.v., and 
will thus have to be continuously revised (see Myrdal 1933; also, with respect to an evolutionary 
policy conception: Witt 2003, 84ff.). 
 
Manifold policy agents and a layered state 
Finally, this applies to policies in a broader sense, i.e., to the policies of different types of policy 
agents, namely (1) the agents involved themselves, who might establish those orientations, goals, 
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and instruments in common discourses and commitments on related collective goods, if possible, 
(2) neutral “network” consultants engaged by the agents involved in an arena, and, of course, (3) 
the public policy agents proper and their intermediaries. They all may make use of the 
orientations, objectives, intervention areas, and tool complexes discussed here. 
 
It has also been argued that a smarter government (stronger and more qualified, as explained) 
would have to be structured and staged itself (rather than just one central bureaucracy of the ideal 
neoliberal state, how reduced ever), according to the tiered and overlapping structures and 
reaches of the manifold common and collective goods and their potential carrier networks and 
groups, from local through global (e.g., Ormerod 2012; Richards 2012; Hallsworth 2012, 44ff.). 
 
Again, the state with such a proactive orientation needs to be put in a strong participatory and 
democratic environment, it must become stronger and more qualified in many respects, be it its 
financial, technical, and informational endowments or the qualification of its personal agents, 
independent of dominant private powers and vested interests, non-corrupt, with the power to 
develop and clarify objectives, stick to them in the long run, be reliable and sustainable, but also 
adaptive49, with the clear expectation of an infinite engagement, increasing its complexity and 
adaptiveness above that of the CA(E)S, prepared to intervene, in specified ways, forever. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
                                                          
49 Many authors phrase this “experimental” policy (e.g., Beinhocker 2012; Colander, Kupers 2014, 276f.). 
47 
 
This paper discussed and strived to qualify some policy principles suggested by previous CE 
literature, and to develop a set of more specific orientations, objectives, tools and measures of an 
economic “complexity policy”, a CA(E)P, from the consideration of the economy as a CA(E)S. It 
exemplarily focused on a particular subset of CA(E)S, i.e., agent- and interaction-based CA(E)S, 
which additionally use evolutionary game-theoretic modeling in an institutional perspective and 
which consider network structures. We briefly investigated basic mechanisms, resulting 
properties, and critical factors (by verbal reasoning and with the illustration of a little model in 
the “evolution-of-cooperation” tradition). We did assume that they are relevant in all CA(E)S. 
 
While the literature on policy implications of CA(E)S and CE has surged after the financial crisis 
2007/8, it still has remained, with few exemptions, largely general. With the above, we hope to 
have provided an original contribution to it. 
 
A set of policy orientations, potential objectives, complexes of potential tools and measures, and 
a conception of politics and policy agents resulted, fundamentally different from the narrow, 
allegedly compulsory, and mostly neoliberal, rough-and-ready “market”-oriented policy 
prescriptions of the economic mainstream. We developed a specific version (or subset) of a 
CA(E)P, a specified framework approach, called Interactive Policy, embedded in what we termed 
new meritorics. Referring back to a simple basic model used here, we could exemplarily integrate 
this CA(E)P with the older conception of merit goods (Musgrave) and the older pragmatist-
institutionalist conception of the negotiated economy (Dewey, Commons). Fundamental aspects 
of such politics are the complexity of the system of politics and policies, democratic participation 
and inclusiveness, a multiplicity of policy agents and a structured, multi-level public agent. Not 
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the least, such framework approach is particularly adaptive, and lean and inexpensive, in spite of 
its pro-active frame-setting. 
 
Self-organization capacities of CA(E)S, thus, and ubiquitous requirements of CA(E)P, of policy 
frame-regulation, were shown not to be mutually exclusive but to form a new interrelation, as 
self-organization is independent of, and often contrary to, any sense of “optimality”. This applies 
particularly under conditions of a myopic individualist culture of de-regulated “markets”. 
 
Such policy expects path dependence, cumulative process, and structural emergence, such as 
institutionalization and lock-in, but also idiosyncrasies, such as complex non-linearities, phase 
transitions, structural breaks, and surprise, and thus non-predictability. CA(E)P recommendations 
therefore are much less certain and apodictic than prescriptions based on the relatively simplistic 
mainstream models, but also lumbering much less into false point-predictions. Rather, CA(E)P 
will be geared to permanent learning and adaptation. Its orientations and frame-interventions 
require much more use of alternative modeling, calculating, simulating alternative paths, and 
exploring the spaces of policy discretion. 
 
CA(E)P will of course also be “systemic” and needs to be sufficiently complex itself, but prepared 
to help agents to reduce the often perceived over-complexity and over-volatility of their decision-
situations, particularly in de-regulated capitalist (“market”) systems. 
 
Such policy will have to regulate in specified interaction with the private interaction system, 
leaving the private system space for adaptation, and making actively use of its change, thus 
recalibrating economic, social, and ecological systems and processes. Policy objectives and tools 
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will have to be continuously developed, clarified, and changed in that process of interactive 
adaptation between the CA(E)S and CA(E)P. 
 
More specifically, such policy will be sensitive towards critical incentive structures, agents’ 
information endowments, experience and expectations, towards futurity and “encultured” time 
horizons, recognized interdependence, and equality, towards network sizes and structures and 
network stability, towards openness and critical time windows for intervention. In support of 
informal instrumental institutions-building by the private (while preventing and dissolving 
ceremonial petrifaction) it also may shape appropriate systems of arenas of private interactions, 
usually layered systems of overlapping and meso-sized arenas, platforms or networks. This may 
include the shaping of income distributions, settlement structures, or industrial size-distributions. 
 
When trying to shift the economy towards sets of outcomes that are societally preferred, and to 
stabilize the socio-economy in that area, through facilitating institutions of reciprocal 
coordination and cooperation, it needs, as said, to be sensitive for its potential sclerotization (or 
ceremonialization), foster its adaptability, and preserve its resilience against shocks. 
 
Such policy (and politics), in spite of being proactive and adaptive, needs to be stable and 
reliable in specific ways, long-run oriented, considering processes and their time requirement, 
thus, also “strong” and qualified with its strategies, measures, and personnel. Such policy 
orientation cannot provide predetermined rough-and-ready answers, strict prescriptions, and 
apodictic statements, but an oriented search strategy for the social provisioning process and for 
the concurrent social inquiry and valuation processes. 
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The recent surge in exploring more appropriate and properly complex economic policies has 
already led to the vision of a discernible and implementable better policy conception, and we 
hope this paper has made a contribution in that direction. But through its very object, CA(E)S, 
CA(E)P requires much more research. Further research may focus on deriving and exploring 
similarly specific and model-based policy implications from those subsets and classes of CA(E)S 
that we have left aside in this paper. 
(12,757 words) 
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